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virtue of
Tl~efollowingessay is bascd on
testimony prrscntcd before the
Ban h~-uptcyCommission in May 1997
in Washington, D.C.
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Today 1 address a single problem
associated with Chapter 11 and propose
alternative changes in Chapter 11 that
might alleviate the problem. There are
many ways to criticize the substance of
Chapter 11 and the procedure embedded
in it. Others will argue today that several
of the proposed changes before this
Commission are unwse. I leave those
specific issues to them; I direct my
attention to a change that would alleviate
many of the other substantive problems
with Chapter 11.
In my opinion the principal difficulty
with Chapter 11 is not that it unfairly
favors one group or that the priorities
which it establishes are misguided. In my
opinion the principal difficulty with
Chapter 11 is that it gives strong
incentives to various Chapter 11 players
to distort the priorities that were
intended by Congress.
It is wrong to think of Chapter 11's as
principally judicial proceedings. A drawn
out Chapter 11 proceeding is best
regarded as a beehive of non-judicial
activity in which each bee is attempting
to seize some part of the available wealth
for itself in ways that are often contrary
to the priorities set down by Congress in
the Bankniptcy Code. Managers (who
may have run the business into the
ground) profit from keeping the business
on life support in Chapter 11 by being
paid salary out of assets that would
otherwise go to prepetition creditors.
Shareholders and unsecured creditors
whose claims appear to be under water

preserve the possibility, however slim, of
some return in a future reorganization by
keeping a Chapter 11 alive. Professionals
hired by the estate - lawyers,
accountants, investment bankers and
others - charge by the hour and so may
have the strongest incenti17esto keep the
Chapter 11 going.
By comparison with an efficient and
expeditious process, the current Chapter
11 is both costly and unfaithful to
Congress' mandate. The additional
amounts paid to lawyers, accountants
and others to get a result that could have
been achieved in shorter time and with
lower fees are dead-weight losses.
Lingering in bankruptcy doubtless
engenders much larger indirect costs,
costs that are hard to measure but still
palpable. These are the costs of business
decisions not made and of other suboptimal business choices that always
occur when a business is under court
supervision and subject to the control of
waning factions.
Apart from [he costs of a continuing
Chapter 11, there is also a reallocation of
resources among the players in what is
often a zero-sum game. If, for example, a
business liquidates after lingering in
Chapter 11, money that otherwise would
and should go to existing creditors will
be diverted into the hands of the
managers. If a plausible threat of even
greater delay can be made by the
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be examples -may call for a longer
period, but those are the exceptions.
Of course, the absence of public
support for delay does not foreclose
cynical and private support for delay
Every person who profits from the
continuation of a Chapter 11has some
incentive to keep it going, even where
the continuation perverts the htribution
scheme. Privately, therefore, managers,
shareholders, unsecured creditors, and
professionals who are paid according to
time spent have a selfish interest in delay
at least to the extent there are assets
available that will be taken from others
and given to them.
Because the current law gives a
substantial incentive to the managers and
their agents to prolong the bankruptcy,
the Commission should be skeptical
about their indorsement of the status
quo. As I have suggested in print, to ask
Harvey Miller to attack Chapter 11is like
asking Itzhak Perlman to bum his violin.
The most successful and renowned
bankruptcy lawyers' virtuoso status
depends upon manipulation of a
complex Chapter 11; they cannot be
objective analysts of its vices and virtues.
A similar claim might also be made

I

concerning bankruptcy judges'
objectivity who, but for the intricate legal
issues in Chapter 11, would be
condemned to live on an intellectual
dunghill. I recognize, therefore, that
there may be substantial silent - even
unconscious - support for maintaining
an elaborate and lengthy proceeding
among the professionals associated with
the process. I believe that this support
should be challenged as potentially selfinterested and motivated by incentives
that the players will not acknowledge in
public and may not admit to themselves.
Assume with me that Congress did
not intend that Chapter 11 proceedings
drag on in the hope that the economy or
some newfound insight might save the
firm. Assume that Congress intended
that Chapter 11's proceed as rapidly as
possible. Assume, too, that it is almost
always in the interest of some of the
parties (perhaps the unsecured creditors,
perhaps the priority creditors, perhaps
the shareholders, and assuredly the
professionals), that the Chapter 11
proceeding be drawn out. How then can
Chapter 11 practice be made to conform
to Chapter 11 theory?
The most obvious but not necessarily
the most efficacious attack upon delay is
to modify the time limits in Section
1121. That is what the Congress did in
1994 when it established shorter dates
for small business bankruptcies. The
periods in Section 1121 can be and often
are extended by judges who are
sympathetic to pleas for more time. A
simple change in the exclusivity period
may be effective if the judge listens
carefully and takes a firm hand, but if the
judge is sympathetic to the pleas of the
debtor or is busy with other things,
shortening the times in Section 1121
may have little impact, for they do not
change the incentives of the parties.
Successful modification of the system
will require altera~ionof the incentives of
the managers, shareholders, creditors,
and their agents. Consider three
possibilities, among many, that might
alter those incentives.
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First is the possibility of replacing the
debtor in possession with a trusCee. Mr.
Sigal has made this suggestion, as have
others, such as Professor Adams. This,
too, is the French process and, of course,
prior to the adoption of the Banlzruptcy
Reform Act in 1978 that was the
invariable procedure in Chapter X.
Contrary to the assumption of the
Bankruptcy Commission of the 19705,
the argument for ousting management
does not depend on the proposition that
the trustee will better operate the
business than the existing management
- though that might be the case. The
trustee is a ghost, a threat; he could
haunt the dreams of the managers. The
statutory authorization of a trustee is the
ever present reminder to management
they may lose their position if they file
Chapter 11, and having filed Chapter 11,
that they may at any time be replaced
and so lose their continuing salaries and
other perquisites. In its conclusion that a
trustee could not operate the business as
effectively as existing management, the
Congress overlooked the fact that the
threat of management's removal might
have a stronger effect upon the Chapter
11 than their actual removal and
replacement. How many firms would
have steered clear of bankruptcy entirely
or alternatively would have passed
directly to Chapter 7 where they belong,
had management been assured that it
would be ousted upon the filing? How
many would have come to a speedy
conclusion with new incentives?
The possibility of a trustee also has
implications for the professionals who
advise the debtor in possession.
Presumably a trustee will bring his own
lawyer, his own accountant, and other
professionals. At minimum the new
trustee will not be beholden to the
existing professionals.
The threat of a trustee should have
salutary effects on the managers of a firm
contemplating or in bankruptcy and
because the managers have greater
control of the firm than any others, the
threat of a trustee may have the largest
and most salutary effect on the incentives
of the players in Chapter 11. There are
many ways to draft a provision for a
trustee. In my view, the stronger the
threat, the better the incentive. The
barriers to the appointmenr: of a trustee
should not be high.

UN~VERSIT~
OF MICHIGAN
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A second possibility for modifying he
incentives of the various parties would be
to amend section 507 (b). Thai provision
now reads in part as follows:
"If the trustee . . . provided adequate
protection of the interest of a holder of a
claim secured by a lien on property of
the debtor ,and if, notwithstanding such
protection, such creditor has a claim
allowable under subsection (a) (1) ol this
section arising from the stay of action
against such property . . . then such
creditor's claim under such subsection
shall have priority over every other claim
allowable under such subsection."
In effect, the provision assures that
certain secured creditors (who have been
provided "adequate" protection that
proves not to be adequate) will be treated
as first priority claimants and will so
prime not only prepetition unsecured
creditors, but many postpetition creditors
as well. Section 507 (b) could be
modified to read as follows:
"A secured creditor shall have a claim
under section 507 (a) (1) with priority
over every other claim allowable under
that subsection. That claim shall equal
the difference between (i) the value of .
the secured creditor's collateral that
would have been available to it at the
filing of the petition and (ii) the value of
the collateral made available to it during
or upon the conclusion of the
bankruptcy proceeding, less the value of
any amounts transferred to that creditor
as adequate protection."
This proposal would allow a secured
creditor to have a priority claim to the
extent of the decrease in value of its
collateral or for the loss arising from
disposition of that collateral during the
pendency of the bankruptcy Because the
money would ultimately come out of the
pockets of pre- and postpetition
unsecured creditors - including the
pockets of other administrative expense
claimants - all of those persons would
find their own interests aligned with the
interests of secured creditors.
I am aware that a provision ol the
kind I suggest will make some
professionals squeal like pigs stuck under
a wire fence. They will argue that no

debtor will be able to hire a lawyer or
accountant unless that person can be
assured of receiving payment ahead of
secured creditors to the extent there are
free assets. I am skeptical of the accuracy
of those assertions and, in anj7 case,
unmo\~ed.In my view, the solution for
the prospective administrati\?e claimant is
to insure a speedy resolution of the
to
Chapter 11 or a quick con~~ersion
Chapter 7 so that the available collateral
is not dissipated.
A third possibility is to amend Section
361 to reverse that part of Timbers qf
Inwood Forat, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988),
that denies lost opportunity costs. Some.
I among them, would argue that the
courts in general and the Supreme Court
in particular have not been true to the
promises made to the secured creditors
in Section 361 and in the 1978 Senate
Report under 36 1. That section promises
the "indubitable equivalent'. (and the
Report buttresses that promise), but after
Timbors the section does not deliver
indubitable equi\ralence. Secured
creditors in the L n ' bankruptcy that
commenced in July 1986 and concluded
in May 1993 were deprived of interest
for the entire period, an amount that
might have doubled their money If
secured creditors were assured of a
proper return on the value of their
collateral (after the time when they
would ha1.e been able to liquidate that
collateral but for the bankruptcy), nTe
might find the unsecured creditors,
shareholders - and possibly even the
professionals - aligned nith secured
creditors in wishing for a hast!. resolution
of a Chapter 11.
I am certain there are other more
clever ways in which the parts of
Chapter 11 - particularly the
administrative po~versand the priority
provisions in Chapters 3 and 5 - can be
manipulated to modify the incentives of
the players in the Chapter 11 game. I
invite you to think of those and to
consider them, too.
I leave you uith two points. First, the
Commission should devote careful
thought to the question of how Chapter
11's can be speeded either to a successful
plan or to a quick conversion to Chapter
7. Speed is an antidote to many ol the
substantive ills in Chapter 11. That speed
nil1 benefit not only secured creditors,
but unsecured creditors as well. It uill

reduce costs and will foreclose
distortions of the bankruptcy priori~>~
scheme in long-running Chapter 1 1s
where managers, shareholders and
postpetition creditors take pqments that
should go to others.
Second, the speed of Chapter 11s nil1
quicken only if the proper incentives are
given to the players In Chapter 11
proceedings - to the bees in the
beehive. It is not enough to modify the
times in Section 1 12 1 or othenqise to
depend upon a busy judge to insure that
things occur on time. Far better to give
to the managers,
the proper incenti~~es
professionals, secured and unsecured
creditors. I indorse the possibility of
shortening the period in Section 112 1,
but I think it better to alter Section 507
(b), rel7erse T ~ T ~ I ~ and
c I - sto, set up a
trustee as threat to existing management.
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